Five leading German political parties and their coalitions are evaluated with regard to party manifestos and results of the 2005 parliamentary elections. For this purpose, the party manifestos are converted into Yes/No answers to 95 topical questions (Relax the protection against dismissals? Close nuclear power plants? etc.). On each question, every party represents its adherents as well as those of the parties with the same position. Therefore, a party usually represents a larger group than its voters. The popularity of a party is understood to be the percentage of the electorate represented, averaged on all the 95 questions. The universality of a party is the frequency of representing a majority of electors. The questions are considered either unweighted, or weighted by an expert, or weighted by the number of GOOGLE-results for given keywords (the more important the question, the more documents in the Internet). The weighting however plays a negligible role because the party answers are backed up by the party ``ideology'' which determines a high intra-question correlation. The SPD (Social-Democratic Party) did not receive the highest percentage of votes, remains nevertheless the most popular and the most universal German party. A comparison of the election results with the position of German Trade Union Federation (DGB) reveals its high representativeness as well. Finally, all coalitions with two and three parties are also evaluated. The coalition CDU/SPD (which is currently in power) is the most popular, and the coalition SPD/Green/Left-Party (which failed due to personal conflicts) is the most universal.
Introduction
is difficult to judge, because no party got an absolute majority of votes 1 . It is known that the bottle-necks of simple majority voting systems are so drastic that the legitimacy of election results can be put in question (Held 1996 , Samons 2004 .
Already in 1770, the member of the Royal Academy of Sciences in Paris J.-Ch. de
Borda (1733-1799) warned against "wrong results" of simple majority vote for more than two parties (Black 1958) . Borda has illustrated it with an example of three candidates A, B, C and 21 voters, see Figure 1 . The winner is the candidate A who receives 8 votes.
On the other hand, A is the most undesired for an absolute majority of 13 of 21 voters.
Preference direction In similar cases, more information than just the first choices should be considered:
candidate rankings (preferences of electors with second and third priorities), preference grades, quantitative estimations, etc. Such problems are studied in the theory of voting and social choice since the 18 century, however, with no unambiguous solution (Mueller 1989) . Therefore, to attain a social consensus, each particular situation should be analyzed from several sides.
The given paper evaluates the five leading political parties in the German parliamen- (Pitkin 1967 , Miller 1964 , Wright 1978 , Miller 1983 , and Brams et al. 1998 . In a sense, both indicators suggest a kind of correlation measure for estimating the proximity between party positions and voters' opinions introduced into political science by Achen (1977 Achen ( , 1978 .
The crosscutting cleavages are determined by 95 dichotomous questions 2 (with Yes/No answers), each dividing the society into two groups, one with positive, and one with negative opinion on the question. The parties, answering these questions, represent some
Yes-groups and some No-groups. The popularity of a party is measured by the size of the group represented, averaged on the 95 questions selected. The universality of a party is the frequency of representing a majority. Therefore, the popularity reflects the spatial aspect of representativeness, and the universality reflects its temporal aspect.
The questions are considered either unweighted, or weighted by an expert, or weighted by the number of GOOGLE-results for given keywords (the more important the question, the more documents in the Internet). It turns out that the weighting plays a negligible role. The party answers backed up by the party "ideology" are highly correlated, making the overall evaluation little sensitive to question weights.
2 The same number as of the Theses by Martin Luther (1517) .
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The quantitative analysis shows that the SPD is the most popular and the most universal German party, although it did not receive the highest percentage of votes. A comparison of the election results with the position of German Trade Union Federation (DGB) reveals its high representativeness as well. Finally, all coalitions with two and three parties are also evaluated. The coalition CDU/SPD (which is actually in power) is the most popular, and the coalition SPD/Green/Left-Party (which failed due to personal conflicts) is the most universal.
In Section 2, "Model", initial data, basic assumptions, and indicators of popularity and universality of parties are introduced. In particular, all the 95 source questions with party answers and weightings are listed.
In Section 3, "Evaluation of parties", the indices of popularity and universality of parties and of DGB are discussed, both for the whole of Germany and for federal states (Länder). The main conclusion is that the SPD has better indicators, although the CDU got the highest percentage of votes.
In Section 4, "Evaluation of coalitions", a kind of coalition formation analysis is performed; for recent references see van Deemen (1997) and de Vries (1999) . For this purpose, the indices of popularity and universality are extended to coalitions with two and three parties. The main conclusion is that the coalition of three left parties could be a better alternative to the centrist coalition currently in power.
In Section 5, "Summary", the main statements of the paper are recapitulated.
In Section 6, "Annex: Computational issues", the mathematical model is rigorously described. The computation formulas are derived and linked to tables and figures of the paper.
Model
Journalists Anne Graef (Einblick, DGB, Berlin) Figure 2 by red, green, and dark-red rectangles 3 (with the lengths being the percentage of votes received by each party). These rectangles lie in the No-Domain to the left from the vertical axis 0%. CDU and FDP will relax the protection against dismissals and represent thereby 35.2 + 9.8 = 45.0% of the electorate. This Yes-group is shown by black and yellow rectangles. It lies in the Yes-Domain to the right from the vertical axis. The sum of both groups is always 96%. The more the No-Group overbalances, the more the total 96%-rectangle is shifted to the left. The more the Yes-Group overbalances, the more it is shifted to the right.
On each question, every party represents its adherents as well as those of the parties with the same position. For example, the SPD's representativeness is 51% on the first · 100% = 90.5% universality.
The indices of popularity and universality can be computed directly (unweighted), or with weight coefficients of the questions. Then the popularity is defined to be the weighted average representativeness, and the universality is defined to be the weighted frequency of representing a majority; for details see Section 6.
Evaluation of parties
The popularity and universality of parties and of DGB are displayed in Figure 3 . Each indicators is given in three versions: for U nweighted (u) questions, for by Anne Graef as Expert (e) weighted questions as well as by GOOGLE-results (g) weighted questions.
Which conclusions do follow from Figure 3?
In spite of shortage of votes, the SPD remains to be the most popular and most universal German party
The 67.5% unweighted popularity of the SPD means that on the average it represents the opinion of 67.5% voters. The unweighted 90.5% universality means that it represents a majority on 86 of 95 questions.
Note that both indices of the SPD are higher than that of the election winner CDU. This means that, despite the unfavorable vote ratio, the SPD represents the electorate better. The shortage of votes is rather due to a disappointment of citizens by the economic recession and governmental policy than due to the electoral program.
High representativeness of the German Trade Union Federation (DGB) The high indices of the DGB mean that it well represents the public opinion and finds a significant support in the society. Note that this conclusion is obtained with no interrogation of public opinion but indirectly, by comparing the position of the DGB with the election results.
Weighting plays a negligible role in the evaluation
As one can see in Figure 3 , the three weighting types of the questions (unweighted, expert-weighting, and GOOGLE-weighting) has a little influence on the indicators' values. Indeed, the party answers are backed up by the party "ideology" which determines a high intra-question correlations. Therefore, under-weighting and even omitting some questions plays a negligible role, because other questions carry superfluous information on the parties (over-weighting some questions is equivalent to under-weighting other questions).
Henceforth, only unweighted indicators will be considered. Table 2 The DGB attains its highest popularity in Brandenburg (65.8%) and the highest universality in Bremen (80%), whereas the CDU has a quite low standing in these federal states. The DGB is least popular and universal in the conservative Bavaria, where the CSU (the Bavarian partner of CDU) has the largest percentage of votes with rank 1 and represents a majority in all the 95 of 95 questions. Universality %/R %/R %/R %/R %/R %/R %/R %/R %/R %/R %/R %/R %/R %/R %/R %/R %/R Rheinland-Pfalz 34.6/8 66.5/13 52.6/9 36.9/3 66.5/3 91.6/2 7.3/10 52.5/14 36.8/8 11.7/2 54.2/3 78.9/1 5.6/9 47.9/14 31. On every question, the coalition members can either agree or disagree. In the first case the coalition is unanimous and unambiguously represents the voters with the same opinion (either Yes-Group, or No-Group). In the second case the coalition is not unanimous and can come to any of alternative opinions. Usually, the impact of coalition members on final coalition opinions is proportional to their weights (number of votes received). However, such a proportionality holds only approximately.
In our model, the proportionality of impact to weights is described by a special parameter p. For example, let the weight ratio of parties within a coalition be 3 : 1. The maximal respect to weight p = 1 means that the larger party determines the coalition opinions with the proportional probability , and the smaller party with probability .
No respect to weight p = 0 means equal impact, so that each of alternative opinions can be accepted by the coalition with probability is accepted and applied to all coalitions considered.
Under the assumption, both indices of popularity and universality turn out to be random variables. The coalition's popularity is understood as the expected size of the voter group represented. It is shown in the fourth column of Table 3 , Expectation. The prediction accuracy is specified in the fifth column of Table 3 , Standard deviation (= square root of the variance) of the size of the group represented. The highest popularity 65.9%
and the highest prediction accuracy (= lowest standard deviation) ±0.5% are inherent in the coalition SPD/CDU, which is currently in power.
The next to last column of Table 3 contains the coalition universality understood as the expected frequency of representing a majority. The last column shows the standard deviation of the underlying random variable, characterizing the prediction accuracy. The most universal coalition is SPD/Green with rank 1 with the expected universality 85.1%
and the second best prediction accuracy ±2.5% (rank 2).
The location of coalitions in the space Popularity-Universality-Unanimity is depicted in Figure 6 . As one can see, the coalitions differ in universality much more than in popularity. The results of principle component analysis are shown in Table 4 . Recall that this type of analysis allows to approximate a cloud of observations with an ellipsoid, which first diameter is the direction of the maximal variance, the second diameter is the second maximal variance, etc. (Jackson 1988 , Krzanowski 1988 , and Seber 1984 . The contribution of universality absolutely predominates in the first two components. Consequently, the universality can be regarded as a more decisive indicator than popularity.
Some more details can be found in Figures 7-8 which show the coalitions in planes
Unanimity-Popularity and Unanimity-Universality. The prediction accuracy (standard deviation) of the indicators is depicted by vertical grey segments. Note the location of coalitions along the ascending diagonal, meaning that the higher the degree of unanimity, the higher the indices of popularity and universality.
The coalition SPD/CDU (now in power) has a high popularity but a low degree of unanimity and a mediocre universality. The coalition SPD/Green/Left-Party (much discussed but not realized) has a higher degree of unanimity, somewhat lower popularity but a much higher universality. The coalition CDU/FDP (which held before the elections) has a higher degree of unanimity but relatively low indices of popularity and universality. 
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All of these show that the best would be likely the coalition SPD/Green/Left-Party which failed due to personal conflicts between party leaders.
5 Summary Similar tasks of coalition analysis have been considered with the use of relational algebras (Schmidt and Ströchlein 1993 , Brink et al. 1997 , de Swart et al. 2003 , Berghammer et al. 2005 . The vector-matrix formulas adduced below are much simpler and have a clear geometric interpretation.
Questions/Agenda By Q denote the agenda with dichotomous questions q, that is, which evoke either positive or negative opinions (Yes/No answers) coded by ±1. In our applications, the list of m = 95 questions is given in the first column of Table 1 .
The importance of questions is reflected by weights µ q which constitute a probability measure µ on Q (the reference to "probability" can be misleading; in fact, we just need a normalized additive measure). It assumes non-negativity µ q ≥ 0 for every q ∈ Q , additivity µ X = q∈X µ q for every subset X ⊂ Q , and normality q µ q = 1 (the totality is 100%) .
(1)
The question weights are collected into the column m-vector
In our application, "unweighted" means equal weights µ q = 1/95. The non-normalized expert weights and GOOGLE-weights are given in the last two columns of Table 1 . To fulfill the normalizing condition (1), divide each weight by the total of the 95 weights in the given column. 
The column 95-vector balance of opinions in the society is the matrix-vector product
Popularity and universality of the candidates (parties) The representativeness r qc of candidate c on question q is the size of the social group represented, measured in fraction (percentage) of the society r qc = total weight of protagonists in the society if b qc = 1 total weight of antagonists in the society if b qc = −1 .
The popularity of candidate c is the weighted average of his representativeness (= expected representativeness)
The universality of candidate c is the weighted frequency with which he represents a non-strict majority (= expected rounded representativeness):
In a sense, the popularity reflects the spatial aspect of representativeness, and the universality reflects its temporal aspect. 
Computing the indicators and their geometrical interpretation
where the vector a is computed from (3).
Thus, the most popular (universal) candidate c has the largest projection of his opinion vector b c (= the cth column of matrix B) on the µ-weighted social vector of balance of opinions µ . a (respectively, on the µ-weighted vector of majority opinion µ . signa) 6 .
The formulas of the theorem are used to compute the indicators in Table 2 and for Figures 3, 4, and 5.
Remark 1 (Analogy with force vectors in physics)
Recall that in mechanics a work is produced by displacements. Accordingly, the only productive constituent of a force vector is its projection on the direction of motion. In The (relative) weights of members of coalition C are collected in the normalized vector
The matrix of opinions of coalition members is the restriction of B to columns c ∈ C:
The balance of opinions within coalition C is the vector
The (degree of) unanimity of coalition C is the total weight of the questions on which the coalition members have equal positions. For instance, SPD and CDU agree in 42 of 95 questions, so that its unanimity is 44.2%.
If a coalition C is unanimous on question q its representativeness r qC is equal to that of its every member. If the coalition is not unanimous, it can come to either positive, or negative opinion on question q. We assume that on question q a coalition C represents protagonists in the society with a probability ranging from the relative weight Under these provisions, the representativeness and the indicators of popularity and universality of a coalition are random variables which behavior for non-unanimous questions depends on the parameter p. The popularity P C and universality U C of coalition C are understood as its expected representativeness and expected rounded representativeness.
Besides, we compute the variance of representativeness and of rounded representativeness as a measure of accuracy of the coalition indicators.
Theorem 2 (Evaluation of coalitions) 
where
, are indicators of the coalition non-unanimity on questions q, with n being the number of coalition members,
ξ c P c is the weighted average popularity of coalition members, and
is the weighted average universality of coalition members.
Besides, if the coalition opinions on non-unanimous questions are independent (= independent negotiations on every question) then
The formulas of the theorem with p = 1 2 are used to compute indicators in Table 3 and for Figures 6, 7, and 8.
Remark 2 (Coalition indicators in the simplest case)
If p = 1 (the impact of coalition members is proportional to their weights) then by (15) and (16) the popularity and universality of a coalition are equal to the weighted average of corresponding indicators of its members: P C = P C and U C = P C .
Proof of Theorem 1
On every question q, obviously 
which matrix form is
as required in (7). Multiplying µ by (20), as required in the definition (4), obtain (8) and (9):
To obtain (10), multiply µ by round [R] , as required by definition (5). To obtain (11), express the rounded representativeness of candidate c on question q by analogy with (19):
and proceed similarly to (21).
Proof of Theorem 2
The unanimity of coalition members c ∈ C on question q means that either all b qc = 1, 
Hence, the total weight of the questions on which the coalition is unanimous Compute the expectation and variance of representativeness r qC of a coalition C for a given question q. Consider two cases.
• Coalition members are unanimous on question q. Express the coalition's representativeness by analogy with (19) and note that r qC is constant, implying 
Compute the popularity P C of a coalition C. Using (25) and (29) The derivation of the variance for the rounded representativeness round[r qC ] of coalition C is similar to (32), but there are two changes to be made:
• The range of the Bernoulli random variable round[r qC ] is 1 instead of |a q |, consequently, a 2 q in (32) should be replaced by 1.
• If a q = 0 in (32), that is, tie opinion in the society on question q, then r qC = 
